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PENSION SYSTEMS AND REFORM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 







The World Bank’s conceptual framework to assess pension systems and reform options evaluates 
initial conditions and the capacity to improve the enabling environment, then focuses on how 
best to work within these to achieve the core objectives of pension systems--protection against 
the risk of poverty in old age and smoothing consumption from one’s work life into retirement.  
The Bank applies a multi-pillared approach towards pension system modalities to address the 
needs of target populations including: (i) a non-contributory “zero pillar” extending some level 
of old-age income security to all of the elderly; (ii) an appropriately sized mandatory “first 
pillar” with the objective of replacing some portion of lifetime pre-retirement income through 
contributions linked to earnings; (iii) a funded mandatory defined-contribution “second pillar” 
that typically provides privately-managed individual savings accounts; (iv) a funded voluntary 
“third-pillar;” and (v) a non-financial “fourth pillar.” The primary evaluation criteria are the 
ability of the system to maintain adequacy, affordability, sustainability, equity, predictability and 
robustness.  The secondary evaluation criteria are the system’s capacity to: minimize labor 
market distortions; contribute to savings mobilization; and contribute to financial market 
development. Because pension benefits are claims against future economic output, it is essential 
that over time pension systems contribute to growth and output to support the promised benefits. 
Going forward, the Bank is focusing on strengthening its support in: (a) establishing a clearer 
results framework to assess pension systems and reforms; (b) enhancing knowledge 
management, including research and learning; and (c) improving implementation capacity. 
JEL Classification: H55, J14, J26 






rē-for´m v.t. & i. 1. make (institution, procedure
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prīmer n. 1. elementary book to 
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pe´nsion n. 1. periodic payment 
made esp. by government or employer 
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This document outlines the conceptual framework behind the World Bank’s thinking on pension 
systems and reform.  As our thinking has evolved over time, we thought it important to 
succinctly summarize our conceptual framework and make it available to the international 
public. 
 
Much of the World Bank’s conceptual framework is contained in the 2005 publication, “Old Age 
Income Support in the 21st Century:  An International Perspective on Pension Systems and 
Reform” and other Bank publications.  Our thinking was sharpened by a request from the Bank’s 
Board of Executive Directors to produce a paper for informal Board discussion that would 
highlight the conceptual framework utilized by staff in their dialogue with member countries.  
Such paper was produced in a participatory process that included the Bank’s regional staff, 
representatives from different sectors and multiple external reviewers.  The paper was discussed 
by the Board in autumn 2007 and the framework received endorsement by its members as 
guidance for future work. 
 
This Social Protection Discussion Paper has been prepared drawing verbatim from the 2007 
Board Discussion Paper.  Its aim is to share the framework the World Bank is applying with 
interested stakeholders including counterpart countries and other development partners.  We 
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PENSION SYSTEMS AND REFORM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report updates and sharpens the Bank’s conceptual framework used by staff in 
approaching pension diagnostic assessments and in designing reform options.
1  The report 
suggests the Bank’s current thinking on the analytic framework used to assess pension needs and 
reform options.  The report has been prepared by the Social Protection Team in the World 
Bank’s Human Development Network in consultation with regional and network staff in Human 
Development, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM), and the Financial and 
Private Sector Development networks. An earlier version was reviewed and comments provided 
by a distinguished panel of external reviewers. 
 
  The Bank has applied a conceptual framework that is based on the importance of 
individual country conditions and the flexible application of a diversified five pillar model 
for pension systems in formulating its analysis and policy recommendations. The framework 
starts with the initial conditions which establish both the motivation for reform and the 
constraints on feasible reform options.  Initial conditions include inherited systems, the reform 
needs of such systems, and the enabling environment which may or may not be conducive to a 
reform process.  Having determined the initial conditions, the framework focuses on the 
importance of identifying the core objectives of country pension systems--protection against the 
risk of poverty in old age and smoothing consumption from one’s work life into retirement.  In 
setting out the objectives of pension systems, policymakers also need to consider broader 
questions of social protection and social policy towards the poor in the society at large. 
  The Bank believes that a multi-pillared approach towards pension system modalities 
is best able to address the needs of the main target populations and provide security against 
the multiple risks facing pension systems.  The overall framework includes:  (i) a non-
contributory “zero pillar” that extends some level of old-age income security to all of the elderly 
where social conditions warrant and fiscal circumstances can sustain such a system and; (ii) an 
appropriately sized mandatory “first pillar” with the objective of replacing some portion of 
lifetime pre-retirement income through contributions linked to earnings, and which is either 
partially funded or financed on a pay-as-you-go basis; (iii) a funded mandatory defined-
contribution “second pillar” that typically provides privately-managed individual savings 
accounts establishing a clear linkage between contributions, investment performance and 
benefits, supported by enforceable property rights and which may be supportive of financial 
market development; (iv) a funded voluntary “third-pillar” taking many forms; and (v) a non-
financial “fourth pillar” that includes access to informal support such as from families, other 
formal social programs such as health and housing, and individual assets. 
  The primary criteria for evaluating pension systems within this framework are 
adequacy, affordability, sustainability, equity, predictability, and robustness: (i) an adequate 
system provides benefits sufficient to prevent old-age poverty (at a country-specific absolute 
                                                 
1 This report draws extensively from a report discussed by the World Bank Board of Directors on October 6, 2007 
entitled: Pension Systems and Reform Discussion Paper. For a more in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the 
framework, concepts and issues presented, see in particular Robert Holzmann and Richard Hinz, Old Age Income 
Support in the 21st Century:  An International Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform, The World Bank, 2005,  
http://go.worldbank.org/NOHR1Y9LU0.  
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level) to the full breadth of the population in addition to providing a reliable means to smooth 
lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the population; (ii) an affordable system is one that 
is within the financing capacity of individuals and the society and does not unduly displace other 
social or economic imperatives or have untenable fiscal consequences; (iii) a sustainable system 
is one that is financially sound and can be maintained over a foreseeable horizon under a broad 
set of reasonable assumptions; (iv) an equitable system is one that provides the income 
redistribution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor consistent with the societal preferences 
in a way that does not tax the rest of society external to the system and provides the same benefit 
for the same contribution; (v) a predictable benefit is provided by a system where the benefit 
formula is specified by law and not subject to the discretion, the defined benefit formula is 
designed to insulate the individual from inflation and wage adjustments prior to retirement or the 
defined contribution investment policy can insulate the beneficiary from material effects on 
benefits from asset price adjustments prior to retirement; and the benefit is automatically indexed 
during retirement so as to shield the worker from effects of price adjustments; and (vi) a robust 
system is one that has the capacity to withstand major shocks, including those coming from 
economic, demographic and political volatility. 
  In addition to the primary criteria some secondary evaluation criteria related to the 
ability of the pension system to contribute to output and growth are incorporated into the 
framework.  These include the capacity to: (i) minimize labor market distortions; (ii) contribute 
to savings mobilization; and (iii) contribute to financial market development. A central tenet of 
the approach is the view that because pension benefits are claims against future economic output, 
it is essential that, over time, pension systems contribute to growth and output to support the 
promised benefits. 
  Going forward, the Bank is focusing on strengthening its support of pension systems 
and reform in three main areas: (i) establishing a clearer results framework to assess pension 
systems and reforms, including better baseline and benchmark data; (ii) enhancing knowledge 




PENSION SYSTEMS AND REFORM CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the importance of pension systems to the economic stability of 
nations and the security of their aging populations has been increasingly recognized by 
countries at all levels of development.  Many pension systems, primarily, although not 
exclusively, those with a dominant publicly managed defined-benefit design operated on a pay as 
you go basis have major fiscal consequences or are projected to be financially unsustainable over 
the long term.  Many of these do not fully deliver on their social objectives of poverty alleviation 
and income smoothing, create significant distortions in the operation of market economies and 
result in redistribution in favor of higher income groups.  Other countries have not yet developed 
meaningful pension and retirement savings systems or have not achieved access to these among 
the broad base of the population.  This exposes many elderly to the risk of a severe decline in their 
living standard or descent into poverty when they are no longer able to work. 
The need to strengthen social insurance and contractual savings systems that provide 
income for the elderly is also driven by the pressures of global population aging, the erosion 
of informal and traditional family support systems, and weaknesses in the governance and 
administration of existing pension systems.  The importance of effective formal sources of 
retirement income is accentuated by changes in work and family patterns including the increasing 
participation of women in formal employment, rising divorce rates, diminishing job stability and 
increases in local and international labor migration.  
To address these demands the World Bank has become involved in reforming pension 
systems and supporting the development of contractual savings arrangements in an 
increasingly diverse range of settings throughout the world. This has been undertaken through a 
variety of lending products, policy advice and technical assistance. Since the mid 1980’s, support 
for pension reforms has become a significant and highly visible element of the Bank’s activities. 
The objective of this report is to update and sharpen the Bank’s conceptual 
framework used by staff in approaching pension diagnostic assessments and in designing  
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reform options.
2  The report suggests the Bank’s current thinking on the analytic framework used 
to assess pension needs and reform options.  The report does not aim to chart new ground in the 
framework for pension assessment and therefore refers to the appropriate reference materials.  The 
report has been prepared by the Social Protection team in the World Bank’s Human Development 
Network in consultation with regional and network staff in Human Development, Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management (PREM), and the Financial and Private Sector 
Development networks. An earlier version was reviewed and comments provided by a 
distinguished panel of external reviewers.
3 
The Bank’s conceptual framework and priority issues emerge from its experience in 
Bank-supported reforms and the changing needs now emerging in client countries.  By 
contributing to knowledge and lending products on a country level, regionally and internationally, 
the Bank has reevaluated and adjusted its position and the formal and informal guidance to staff.  
Central anchors provide an overall policy perspective in close collaboration with operational teams 
in the regions.  The Bank’s thinking thus embeds lessons from successful and unsuccessful 
experiences as well as the feedback from client countries.  Following the important work of the 
mid-1990’s, Averting the Old Age Crisis that established key principles and concepts, the Bank’s 
attention has increasingly focused on refining system designs to adapt these principles to widely 
varying conditions and better address the needs of diverse populations to manage the risks in old 
age. The conceptual framework for the Bank’s pension work is presented in the 2005 report, Old 
Age Income Support in the 21st Century: An International Perspective on Pension Systems and 
Reform.  The findings of these and important regional reports illustrate the evolution of thinking 
                                                 
2 This report draws extensively from a report discussed by the World Bank Board of Directors on October 6, 2007 
entitled: Pension Systems and Reform Discussion Paper. For a more in-depth and comprehensive discussion of the 
framework, concepts and issues presented, see in particular Robert Holzmann and Richard Hinz, Old Age Income 
Support in the 21st Century:  An International Perspective on Pension Systems and Reform, The World Bank, 2005,  
http://go.worldbank.org/NOHR1Y9LU0. 
3 The reviewers were: Ian Vasquez, Director of the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, The Cato Institute; 
Christian Larroulet, Director, Institute of Liberty and Development, Chile; Youssef Boutros-Ghali, Minister of 
Finance, Arab Republic of Egypt; Stuart Leckie, Investment Actuary, Sterling Finance, Hong Kong; Edward Odundo, 
Chief Executive Officer, Retirement Benefits Authority of Kenya; and Jerzy Hausner, Professor, Cracow University of 
Economics and Former Undersecretary of State for the Social Security Reform and Chief Adviser to the Deputy Prime 
Minister of Poland.  
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within the Bank and the importance of a policy framework that is sufficiently flexible to address 
diverse country conditions.
4 
This note is organized as follows: Section II outlines the conceptual framework used in 
the Bank’s approach to the analysis of pension systems and reform options.  Section III discusses 
priority issues for the Bank going forward. 
II.   THE BANK’S APPROACH TO PENSION REFORM 
A.   Conceptual Framework 
The Bank’s experience suggests that there are no universal solutions to the complex 
array of pension issues nor is there a simple reform model that can be applied in all settings.  
The Bank has, however, developed principles of analysis and a conceptual framework to guide its’ 
work in this area.  This framework incorporates assessment of initial conditions and capacities in 
relation to a multi-pillar model of the potential modalities for pension systems that establish a 
broad but defined range of potential reform designs.  These possible designs are then evaluated 
against a set of primary and secondary evaluation criteria in an attempt to reach an outcome that is 
contoured to country-specific conditions, needs and objectives.  
The conceptual framework starts with an assessment of the initial conditions that 
establish the motivation for, and constraints on, feasible reform options.  Initial conditions 
include inherited systems, the reform needs of such systems, and the enabling environment which 
may or may not be conducive to potential elements of a reform design and process (See Table 1).  
The inherited system includes existing mandatory and voluntary pension systems, the acquired 
rights of workers and retirees, related social security schemes, existing family and community 
support of retirees, and old age vulnerability and poverty prevalence.  Reform needs are 
determined by applying the adequacy, affordability, sustainability, equity, predictability and 
robustness criteria discussed below to existing schemes.  Finally, the enabling environment 
includes the demographic profile; the macroeconomic environment; the capacity of administrative, 
regulatory and supervisory institutions; and the breadth, depth and efficiency of financial markets, 
particularly with respect to long-term instruments. 
                                                 
4
 See Appendix 1 for a list of central and regional reports with full citations.  In the interest of brevity, we have not 
cited the many documents produced by Bank staff on country specific and issue specific pension reform issues.  
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Table 1. The Bank’s Conceptual Framework  
 
Initial Conditions  I. Inherited System 
  Elderly vulnerability and poverty prevalence in absolute terms and relative to other 
age groups 
  Existing mandatory and voluntary pension systems 
  Existing social security schemes 
  Existing levels of family and community support 
 
II. Reform needs – such as modifying existing schemes in the face of fiscal 
unsustainability, coverage gaps, aging and socio-economic changes assessed against the 
primary and secondary evaluation criteria below 
 
III. Enabling environment  
  Demographic profile 
  Macroeconomic environment 
  Institutional Capacity 
  Financial market status 
 
Core Objectives of 
Pension Systems 
  Protection against the risk of poverty in old age 




  Zero Pillar – non-contributory basic benefits financed by the state, fiscal conditions 
permitting 
  First Pillar – mandatory with contributions linked to earnings and objective of 
replacing some portion of lifetime pre-retirement income. 
  Second Pillar - mandatory defined contribution plan with independent investment 
management 
  Third Pillar - voluntary taking many forms (e.g. individual savings; employer 
sponsored; defined benefit or defined contribution)  
  Fourth Pillar - informal support (such as family), other formal social programs (such 




  Adequacy 
  Affordability 
  Sustainability 
  Equity 
  Predictability 
  Robustness 
Secondary Evaluation 
Criteria 
Contribution to output and growth through: 
  Lowering labor market distortions 
  Contributing to savings 
  Contribution to financial market development 
 
Having evaluated the initial conditions and the capacity to improve the enabling 
environment, the policy framework then focuses on how best to work within these to achieve 
the core objectives of pension systems--protection against the risk of poverty in old age and 
smoothing consumption from one’s work life into retirement.  In setting out the objectives of 
the pension system, policymakers need to consider broader questions of social protection and 
social policy which consider the poverty and vulnerabilities of different income groups.  Key 
questions for consideration in this context are, for example, should scarce fiscal resources be 
devoted towards providing old-age poverty protection in those societies where data suggests that  
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there are other groups such as children that may face greater poverty prevalence or vulnerability?  
How much should a society aim to redistribute income through the pension system and how can it 
ensure that this redistribution is made transparent and progressive?  What measures should be 
taken to strengthen the enabling environment that are conducive to reform options best satisfying 
the core objectives?  Once these core objectives have been identified, one can then identify the 
mandate of the public pension system, the balance between insurance and adequacy functions and 
appropriate system design options. 
The Bank’s policy framework flexibly applies a five-pillar model defining the range of 
design elements that is summarized in Table 2 below to determine the pension system 
modalities and reform options that should be considered.  Country-specific conditions require a 
tailored and tactically sequenced implementation of the model that will substantially define the 
range of feasible options.  Consideration of the full range of possible elements at this stage and 
seeking to incorporate multiple elements of the model in design is based on the view that a 
diversified system can deliver retirement income more effectively and efficiently.  Multipillar 
designs provide more flexibility than monopillars and are therefore typically better able to address 
the needs of the main target groups in the population and provide more security against the 
economic, demographic, and political risks faced by pension systems.  Single pillar schemes are 
also less effective than multipillar designs when measured in terms of the four evaluation criteria 
discussed below (See para. 12).
5  The five pillars are: 
•  A non-contributory or “zero pillar” (e.g. in the form of a demogrant,
6 social pension, or 
general social assistance typically financed by the local, regional or national government), 
fiscal conditions permitting, to deal explicitly with the poverty alleviation objective in order to 
provide all of the elderly with a minimal level of protection.  This ensures that people with low 
lifetime incomes are provided with basic protection in old age, including those who only 
participate marginally in the formal economy.  Whether this is viable—and the specific form, 
level, eligibility and disbursement of benefits depends upon the prevalence and need of other 
vulnerable groups, availability of budgetary resources and the design of complementary 
                                                 
5 It should be pointed out that the weaknesses of monopillars apply equally to defined-contribution and defined-benefit 
schemes. 
6 A demogrant is the same as a universal flat benefit, where individuals receive an amount of money based solely on 
age and residency.  
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elements of the pension system; 
•  a mandatory “first pillar” with contributions linked to varying degrees to earnings with the 
objective of replacing some portion of lifetime pre-retirement income. First pillars address, 
among others, the risks of individual myopia, low earnings, and inappropriate planning 
horizons due to the uncertainty of life expectancies, and the lack or risks of financial markets.  
They are typically financed on a pay-as-you-go basis and thus are, in particular, subject to 
demographic and political risks; 
•  a mandatory “second pillar” that is typically an individual savings account (i.e. defined 
contribution plan) with a wide set of design options including active or passive investment 
management, choice parameters for selecting investments and investment managers, and 
options for the withdrawal phase.  Defined contribution plans establish a clear linkage between 
contributions, investment performance and benefits; support enforceable property rights; and 
may be supportive of financial market development.  When compared to defined benefit plans 
they can subject participants to financial and agency risks as a result of private asset 
management, the risk of high transaction and administrative costs, and longevity risks unless 
they require mandatory annuitization; 
•  a voluntary “third-pillar” taking many forms (e.g. individual savings for retirement, disability 
or death; employer sponsored; defined benefit or defined contribution) but is essentially 
flexible and discretionary in nature. Third pillars compensate for rigidities in the design of 
other systems but include similar risks as second pillars; and 
•  a non-financial fourth pillar which includes access to informal support (such as family 
support), other formal social programs (such as health care and/or housing), and other 
individual financial and non-financial assets (such as home ownership and reverse mortgages 
where available). The availability and type of such support for the aged  has a major bearing on 
the design and implementation of the other pillars, including target benefit levels.  
  -7- 
Table 2. Multipillar Pension Taxonomy  
 
Note: The size of x or X, normal or bold, characterizes the importance of each pillar for each target group. 
Source: Holzmann and Hinz, Old Age Income Support in the 21st Century, Table 1, p. 10. 
 
An essential feature of the multipillar taxonomy is that certain pillars are better 
suited to address the needs of target populations (the lifetime poor, informal sector workers 
at risk of becoming poor once they stop working, and workers covered by formal pension 
arrangements) while also providing diversification for all income groups.  For example, a zero 
pillar social pension is well suited to address the need for basic income support of the lifetime poor 
while also providing a foundation that covers gaps in coverage and benefit adequacy in societies 
with mandatory first and second pillar schemes that may not be reaching workers through their full 
working lives due to their movement in and out of formal employment. Similarly, in societies that 
have only been able to achieve limited coverage of mandatory first and second pillar schemes, 
developing well-supervised voluntary (third pillar) schemes may effectively reach the informal 
sector and provide an efficient means to supplement and diversify benefits for higher income 
Objective   Target  groups  Main  criteria 













0  X  X  x  “Basic” or “social 
pension,” at least social 













1     X  Public pension plan, 
publicly managed, defined 













2     X  Occupational or personal 
pension plans, fully funded 
defined benefit or fully 





3 x  X X  Occupational or personal 
pension plans, partially or 
fully funded defined benefit 









4  X  X  X  Access to informal (e.g. 
family support), other 
formal social programs 
(e.g. health) and other 
individual financial and 
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groups.  Some of the same societies may find that mandated first and second pillar schemes present 
obstacles to increased formalization of the labor force and achieve better outcomes with a 
combination of a social pension and a more extensive voluntary system.  Finally, public policies 
which are supportive of transfers of family wealth such as through land and asset titling, registries 
and inheritance laws, can strengthen old-age income security of both the lifetime poor and 
informal sector. 
The policy framework evaluates the range of overall systems designs through the 
application of a combination of primary and secondary criteria. The primary criteria are the 
ability of the reform to maintain adequacy, affordability, sustainability, equity, predictability and 
robustness while achieving welfare-improving outcomes in a manner appropriate to the current 
and expected environment of the individual country: 
•  An adequate system is one that provides benefits sufficient to prevent old-age poverty (at a 
country-specific absolute level) to the full breadth of the population in addition to providing a 
reliable means to smooth lifetime consumption for the vast majority of the population; 
•  An affordable system is one that is within the financing capacity of individuals and the society 
and does not unduly displace other social or economic imperatives or have untenable fiscal 
consequences; 
•  A sustainable system is one that is financially sound and can be maintained over a foreseeable 
horizon under a broad set of reasonable assumptions;  
•  An equitable system is one that provides the income redistribution from the lifetime rich to the 
lifetime poor consistent with the societal preferences in a way that does not tax the rest of 
society external to the system; and one that provides the same benefit for the same 
contribution. 
•  A predictable benefit is provided by a system where (i) the benefit formula is specified by law 
and not subject to the discretion of policymakers or administrators, (ii) the defined benefit 
formula is designed to insulate the individual from inflation and wage adjustments prior to 
retirement or the defined contribution investment policy can insulate the beneficiary from 
material effects on benefits from asset price adjustments prior to retirement; and (iii) the 
benefit is automatically indexed during retirement so as to shield the worker from effects of 
price adjustments; and  
•  A robust system is one that has the capacity to withstand major shocks, including those coming 
from economic, demographic and political volatility.  
  -9- 
 
Application of these criteria requires consideration of the linkages between the 
various elements and the associated tradeoffs among them.  For example, contribution rates for 
a mandatory first pillar system that are deemed to be affordable to employers and employees may 
result in issues of the adequacy of benefits or sustainability of the systems financing.  In addition, 
other public policy provisions can materially affect the ability of a particular country to fulfill these 
criteria.  Adequacy in preventing old-age poverty is, for example, closely linked to the manner in 
which health care for the elderly, typically representing a very large component of consumption for 
this age group, is financed.  Evaluation and resolution of these tradeoffs further highlights the 
country specific nature of the decision process. 
Once a system and/or reform has been assessed in relation to the primary criteria, 
secondary evaluation criteria should be considered to evaluate the system’s contribution to 
output and growth.  This is based on the understanding that the capacity of any pension system to 
provide effective sources of retirement income is inextricably linked to its ability to support 
economic stability and development. The relevant criteria in this respect include: (i) minimization 
of labor market distortions; (ii) contribution to savings mobilization; and (iii) contribution to 
financial market development.  Regardless of the design of the system pension benefits are 
effectively claims against future economic output. It is, therefore, essential that, over time, the 
systems contribute to growth and output to be able to provide the promised benefits.  To achieve 
this, a reform should support labor and capital market efficiency, reinforce measures to improve 
savings mobilization and facilitate financial market development.  
B.   Design Principles in Determining Reform Choices 
Although there is no simple template for determining the relative pillar size and 
instrumentality appropriate to the diverse array of country circumstances, several basic 
principles are used to guide these choices.  As indicated above, relevant and feasible reform 
options depend on country-specific circumstances which are broadly linked with the development 
status and income level of a country.  While capacity and reform potential are linked, the 
relationship between income level and reform options are substantially influenced by non-income 
factors.  Reform paths are therefore highly complex depending upon inherited system, reform 
needs, the enabling environment and substantially dependent upon incremental policy decisions in 
the process. This path dependency therefore results in variation between a country’s income level  
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and development status on the one hand, and suitable policy reform options on the other.  A more 
in-depth discussion of path dependency and policy options and a stylized representation of the 
linkages are indicated in Appendix 2. 
In addition to the relationships with the level of development and income several 
other principles are incorporated into the decision process on an appropriate pension system 
design.  Key overarching principles include: 
  Prefunding of future pension commitments for all pillars is generally advantageous for 
economic and political reasons provided conditions are right.
7  The key to determining 
whether prefunding is advantageous is a comparison of the expected benefits (such higher 
capital stock and future output) with the expected costs (such as transition costs and 
intergenerational equity).  Politically, prefunding may better guarantee the capacity of society 
to fulfill pension commitments because it ensures that pension liabilities are backed by assets 
protected by legal property rights.  
  A mandatory and fully-funded second pillar provides a useful benchmark (though not a 
blueprint) against which the design of a reform should be evaluated. A well-designed 
second pillar will generally satisfy the adequacy, affordability, sustainability and 
robustness criteria when implemented under the appropriate conditions.
8  A s  a  
benchmark, a second pillar serves as a reference point for the policy discussion and as a means 
to evaluate the potential welfare improvement. The efficiency and equity of alternative 
approaches to retirement savings, such as voluntary individual or occupational schemes can 
also be evaluated in relation to this benchmark. 
  In order for first pillars to satisfy the affordability and sustainability criteria, such 
schemes should be relatively small, simple and universal.  Small refers to the mandated 
                                                 
7 Prefunding refers to establishing a pool of assets for the exclusive purpose of financing future pension benefits.  
Narrow prefunding refers to the matching of individual pension claims with assets, while broad prefunding refers to 
with a corresponding increase in the capital stock. 
8 Most members of the academic and development communities as well as within the Bank agree that certain enabling 
conditions including macroeconomic, financial market and institutional characteristics are supportive of second pillar 
reforms.  There is a spectrum of views however, as to what constitute the minimum conditions conducive towards 
success with some placing greatest importance on the clarity of the policy framework while others placing equal 
importance on environmental considerations.  The Bank is working on guiding diagnostic criteria for assessing the 
enabling conditions for establishing privately-managed second pillar reforms.  
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replacement rate, which should be modest enough to ensure sustainable financing and support 
compliance.  Simple refers to the design of benefits and the advantage of a close link between 
contributions and benefits.  Universal refers to the application to all sectors of an economy in 
order to allow mobility across professions.  Redistribution in the pension system in favor of 
lower-income groups should be provided in a transparent manner.  A system fulfilling these 
principles should help to minimize distortions in the labor market and deal with population 
aging in an incentive-oriented manner. 
  A broader assessment of risk, vulnerability and poverty of all age groups has important 
implications for the desired objectives and characteristics of pensions systems: (i) 
Mandating the participation of the very poor in a public, earnings-related pension schemes is 
likely to be welfare decreasing and difficult to enforce.  Faced with so many other life course 
risks against which they lack risk management instruments, mandatory contributions to a 
pension scheme for the very poor is not optimal; (ii) The most damaging everyday risks for 
poor people are those that prevent them from working to sustain themselves and their families.  
A non-contributory social pension applicable to the disabled and to elderly beginning at an age 
when work is not feasible anymore caters to these needs and priorities in countries where these 
risks are more prevalent than risks of old-age poverty and where there are the resources to 
provide such remedies; and (iii) Since unemployment and old-age-related risks are imperfectly 
correlated, more-developed countries may gain from pooling these risks over time.  Further, in 
view of the moral hazards associated with unemployment insurance, introducing 
unemployment savings accounts that become old-age savings accounts upon retirement may 
create efficiency gains. 
  The experience of the Bank also suggests that a major emphasis should be given to the 
process of pension reform, including what are commonly termed the political economy 
aspects. Three process criteria are therefore relevant: 
•  A long-term, credible commitment by the government.  The reform needs to be effectively 
aligned with the political economy of the country and supported by a clear political mandate.  
Political conditions under which the reform will be implemented need to be sufficiently stable 
to provide a reasonable likelihood for a full implementation and maturation of the reform; 
•  Local buy-in and leadership. This includes credibility with the population at large. The 
preparation of a pension reform has to be undertaken primarily by the country itself, by its  
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politicians and technicians, and be effectively communicated to, and accepted by, the 
population at large; and 
•  Sufficient capacity-building and support for implementation arrangements. These include, as 
necessary, reforms in governance, the collection of contributions, record keeping, client 
information, asset management, regulation and supervision, and benefit disbursement. 
Establishment of a legal framework is only an initial and potentially insufficient step that needs 
to be followed-up with extensive local capacity and institution building. 
 
  The use of a multi-pillar model may be interpreted to indicate an infinite range of 
acceptable outcomes.  In reality, however, this has not proven to be the result.  The application of 
the broader policy principles and the constraints imposed by individual country circumstances has 
the practical effect of focusing the Banks advice and support for pension reforms to a constrained 
set of outcomes that are generally recognized as a clear, although evolving, World Bank 
perspective.  This is a view that continues to assign a high priority to parametric reform of 
unsustainable pay as you go systems and to rely on diversification of instruments to manage long 
term risks and the introduction of innovations such as Non-financial Defined Contribution (NDC) 
schemes.  The approach has consistently led to reforms that incorporate advanced funding as 
highly advantageous to the equity, sustainability and developmental synergies of pension reform.  
It has been characterized by an increasing focus on consideration of the inclusion of minimum 
benefits to strengthen the poverty alleviation outcomes in settings not conducive to broad coverage 
of social insurance arrangements or contractual savings based designs. 
III.   PRIORITY ISSUES GOING FORWARD  
 
  Going forward, the Bank is focusing on strengthening its support of pension systems and 
reform in three main areas: (i) establishing a clearer results framework to assess pension systems 
and reforms, including better baseline and benchmark data; (ii) enhancing knowledge 
management, including research and learning; and (iii) improving implementation capacity. 
 Results  framework:  The conceptual framework established the primary evaluation 
criteria (i.e. adequacy, affordability, sustainability, equity, predictability, robustness) and 
secondary criteria (lowering labor market distortions, contributions to saving, and contributions to 
financial market development, respectively) for assessing pension systems and their reforms.   
However, application of these criteria requires the development of a detailed set of indicators and  
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strengthening of evaluation techniques.  The broad range of next steps to strengthen the results 
framework includes: (i) refining the Bank’s Pension Reform Option Simulation Toolkit (PROST), 
including stochastic simulation; (ii) broadening the Axia APEX model which projects benefit 
entitlements across countries according to a unified framework through inclusion of the 
contribution dimension in addition to the benefit dimension; and (iii) major improvements in cross-
country indicators and the quality of underlying data for baseline development and evaluation. 
  Knowledge management, including learning and research.  The topics identified and to 
be addressed during the coming years in a cross-sector approach include: (i) designing pension 
systems; (ii) implementing pension reforms; (iii) governance, administration, regulation and 
supervision; (iv) economic and social impact; and (v) country cases and regional studies.  This 
knowledge agenda is guided by recent trends in client countries that include: introduction of 
measures to further strengthen the basic elderly income support through changes to minimum 
pension guarantees and social pensions; actions to diminish the future role of second pillars, either 
by constraining the flow of new entrants to the second pillar or facilitating the switch of existing 
contributors back to the defined-benefit system; measures to improve coverage of mandatory 
schemes, including through inducements such as government contributions and improved linkages 
to social pensions; parametric and structural reforms to first pillars both in reformed multi-pillar 
schemes and in schemes that have yet to undertake such reforms; and increasing measures by 
countries improve financial literacy through financial education. 
 Implementation  capacity.  Many country efforts at applying relevant knowledge and 
external experience in their country setting are hampered by limitations in implementation 
capacity.  Priority support by the World Bank for strengthening such implementation capacity 
includes: (i) creating region-specific learning programs which emulate the Bank’s highly 
successful Pensions Core Course for staff in client countries; (ii) enhancing cooperation with 
international and bilateral partners, including professional organizations, in order to improve the 
consistency of policy advice and avoid duplication; and (iii) improving readiness indicators for 
pension reform, including self-diagnosis by client countries.  
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APPENDIX 2: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC OPTIONS FOR REFORM: POLICY PROGRESSION AND PATH 
DEPENDENCY
9 
Choices selected amongst reform options depend on a number of country-specific 
considerations, the most important being the existing pension scheme (and other related 
public programs); the special reform need(s) of schemes; and the (enabling or disabling) 
environment.  All these considerations are broadly linked with the development status and 
income level of a country.  This has led to suggestions that the Bank offer a policy framework or 
progression that presents the breadth of reform options in relation to the enabling environment, 
addressing linkages to such factors as development status and fiscal and institutional capacity.  
This appendix addresses this suggestion, although, in order to condense the many potential 
combinations and variations, the result is more stylized than prescriptive. 
While it is generally true that poorer countries with lower fiscal and administrative 
capacity have fewer options and that richer countries with a more supportive environment 
have more options, the progression of options is not linear.  This is due to the legacy or 
absence of the existing system(s).  Most critically, while a rich OECD country with full fiscal 
and administrative capacity could, from an enabling environment point of view, move toward 
any system, the actual (best) choice will have to consider the inherited system, including the 
implicit pension debt and institutional setup.  As a result, the introduction of a second pillar may 
be a potential option, but not the best or even a feasible policy choice.  In contrast, in a reform-
minded middle-income country with moderate implicit debt and sufficient fiscal and 
administrative capacity, such a choice may be viable and desirable. 
A stylized representation of choices would limit constraints to three broad areas—
the existing system, the need for reform, and reform environment—and, within each set, to 
a few central features with limited properties (See Table 3). Going through a larger set of 
features and properties would create a decision or choice tree of a few thousand entries, but not 
necessarily produce a better understanding of the operative principles.  The choice of constraints, 
features, and properties is clearly influenced by actual experience with reform.  For the inherited 
system, the crucial features are the existence or absence of pension systems, their heterogeneity, 
the level of coverage (and implicit debt), and the type of benefit and funding.  For reform needs, 
the suggested crucial features are fiscal issues, low rate of return, multiplicity of systems, and 
coverage.  With regard to the enabling environment, the suggested key features are macro and 
fiscal room, administrative capacity, minimum financial sector, and government commitment to 
reform. 
The suggested progression of policy choice for low-income countries is relatively 
straightforward, but perhaps less simple than might be expected.  In post-conflict countries 
without a prior scheme, the emphasis for the elderly should clearly be on poverty relief for the 
most vulnerable.  However, the elderly may not be the most vulnerable, and the most vulnerable 
may include persons of all ages who are disabled by civil strife, including many children.  In 
these circumstances, war veterans expect compensation for their efforts, preferably in the form of 
a pension, which risks becoming mixed with the perceived need to provide some pension to civil 
servants, in part to reduce the vulnerability to corruption. If obligations toward public sector 
employees under a pre-conflict scheme need to be honored, in what form and how should they be 
linked to a new system and what should it look like?  
                                                 
9 This appendix is reprinted from Old Age Income Support in the 21
st Century, op. cit., pp. 84-92.  
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Most low-income countries have a pension system for at least a subset of their 
population—public sector employees (that is, civil servants and workers in parastatals). These 
systems are typically in dire financial condition and urgently require reform. The reform 
direction will be very much determined by the reform environment.  With low capacity and 
political willingness for reform, little more than minimum adjustments of the existing scheme(s) 
and stronger community support for the vulnerable elderly can be expected.  However, in a 
reform-oriented environment with some, albeit limited, capacity, the reform options are much 
more comprehensive: a comprehensive parametric or even a notional defined-contribution-
oriented reform of the unfunded scheme; improved governance of funded schemes; the 
introduction or at least the testing of a noncontributory pension scheme; and the introduction and 
improved regulation of emerging voluntary schemes are appropriate to these conditions. 
Middle-income countries generally have a wider set of feasible policy choices. The 
limitations for this quite heterogeneous group of countries are derived more from the capacity 
constraints than from inherited systems.  As a result, for countries with limited capacity and 
political willingness to reform, the basic reform choices boil down to damage control and basic 
adjustments.  Strongly reform-oriented countries with sufficient capacity at the fiscal and 
administrative levels have the full array of options open to reform an unfunded or funded 
(mandated) public scheme.  As the coverage—and hence implicit debt—of the inherited system 
is typically small, the move toward a full second pillar can be envisaged.  If the inherited 
unfunded scheme is large (as in most transition economies), the set of options is restricted and 
the move toward a funded, mandated pillar may be partial.  
For high-income countries, the set of feasible policy choices may appear to be even 
more enhanced, but this may not be the case.  For these countries, which are also quite 
heterogeneous in their composition, the limitations are quite likely to derive from the inherited 
system rather than from capacity issues, although the latter can be significant.  As in middle-
income (and low-income) countries, a rich country under (macro and fiscal) stress, with a 
government not fully committed to reform, will be restricted to damage control and incremental 
parametric reforms.  A reform-oriented country, with all of the needed capacity but with an 
inherited Bismarckian system with high implicit debt, is likely to exclude a move toward a 
funded (second) pillar among its choices, even if it is only partial.  Presumably, many countries 
in continental Europe fall into this category.  Those few economies with full capacity but only 
basic income provisions will move toward mandated funded provisions. 
While there is, indeed, a link between capacity and reform space, the link is not 
linear.  The feasible options and actual choices will be (co)determined by the inherited system. 
This suggested path dependence of reform space implies that reform-oriented, middle-income 
countries need to assess their choices carefully and work diligently on their capacity for reform if 
they do not want to be constrained in the future.  By extension, the same applies to low-income 
countries and their need to find the appropriate moment to introduce and better regulate and 
supervise voluntary systems.  
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Table 3. Stylized Reform Choices for Countries: Matching Reform Needs with Constraints and Opportunities
10 
Type of country  Existing system  Reform needs  Reform environment  Central reform options 
Low income       
Post conflict  No system and coverage  Protect the most vulnerable  All capabilities essentially 
absent 
Provide basic support and services via social 
funds, nongovernmental organizations, and 
international aid and avoid the introduction of 
costly civil servant schemes and the 





Notional defined benefit 
for public sector with 
limited coverage 
Deal with fiscal costs; extend 
coverage 
No macro and fiscal room, 
limited administrative 
capacity, no financial sector, 
some government willingness 
to reform 
 
Undertake a parametric adjustment of the 
unfunded system and provide community-
based support for the vulnerable elderly  
Notional defined benefit 
for public sector with 
limited coverage 
Deal with fiscal costs; extend 
coverage 
Limited macro and fiscal 
room, administrative 
capacity, and financial sector, 
but willingness to reform 
Undertake parametric reform of the unfunded 
system (perhaps with a view to notional 
defined contribution); introduce, regulate, and 
supervise the voluntary system; introduce and 





contribution or defined 
benefit for public sector 
with limited coverage 
Improve rate of return; extend 
coverage 
Limited macro and fiscal 
room, administrative 
capacity, and financial sector, 
but willingness to reform 
Improve governance of the central or 
provident fund; introduce, regulate, and 
supervise a voluntary system; introduce and 
test noncontributory pensions  
       
Middle income       
Under stress  Multiple notional defined 
benefit (and funded 
defined contribution) with 
moderate coverage 
Deal with fiscal costs, low 
rate of return, multiplicity of 
systems, and labor market 
issues; extend coverage 
Limited fiscal room, 
administrative capacity, 
financial sector, as well as 
willingness to reform 
Undertake parametric adjustment or reforms 
of the unfunded systems; improve governance 
of central and provident fund; regulate and 
supervise a voluntary system 
                                                 
10 Source: Old Age Income Support in the 21
st Century, Table 5.2, op. cit. pp. 85-90.  
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Table 2. Stylized Reform Choices for Countries: Matching Reform Needs with Constraints and Opportunities (cont.) 
 
Type of country  Existing system  Reform needs  Reform environment  Central reform options 
Multiple notional defined 
benefit with moderate 
coverage (and implicit 
pension debt) 
Deal with fiscal costs, 
multiplicity of systems, and 
labor market issues; extend 
coverage 
Some fiscal room, 
administrative capacity, and 
financial sector and strong 
willingness to reform 
Introduce a single unfunded system (such as 
notional defined contribution), move toward a 
fully funded system, or adopt a mixture of 
both; introduce, regulate, and supervise a 
voluntary system; introduce noncontributory 
pensions (social pension) 
 
Emerging and 
reform oriented  
Multiple funded defined 
contribution with 
moderate coverage 
Deal with low rate of return 
(and captive public bond 
market); extend coverage 
Some fiscal room, 
administrative capacity, and 
financial sector and strong 
willingness to reform 
Introduce a single funded system (funded 
defined contribution); introduce, regulate and 
supervise voluntary system; introduce 
noncontributory pensions (social pensions) 
 
High income       
Under stress  Multiple notional defined 
benefit with high 
coverage (and implicit 
pension debt) 
Deal with fiscal costs, 
multiplicity of systems, and 
labor market issues; keep or 
extend coverage 
Some administrative capacity 
and financial sector, but 
limited macro and fiscal room 
and political willingness to 
reform 
Undertake coordinated parametric reforms of 
the unfunded systems; improve regulation 
and supervision of the voluntary system; 
improve the existing noncontributory pension 
systems 
 
Basic income support but 
not mandated earnings-
related scheme 
Deal with current and future 
fiscal costs (aging); improve 
consumption smoothing for 
population 
Strong administrative 
capacity, macro and fiscal 
position, financial sector, and 
willingness to reform 
 
Introduce a (limited) mandated and fully 
funded scheme; improve regulation and 




(provident fund) with 
limited basic income 
support 
Deal with low rate of return; 
keep or extend coverage 
Strong administrative 
capacity, macro and fiscal 
position, financial sector, and 
willingness to reform 
Improve governance of the centralized 
scheme, including opting out after minimum 
balance; improve regulation and supervision 
of the voluntary system; improve the existing 





Multiple notional defined 
benefit with high 
coverage (and implicit 
pension debt) 
Deal with fiscal costs, 
multiplicity of systems, and 
labor market issues; keep or 
extend coverage 
Strong administrative 
capacity, macro and fiscal 
position, financial sector, and 
willingness to reform 
Move toward a single unfunded system (such 
as notional defined contribution); strengthen 
regulation and supervision of the voluntary 
system; introduce and strengthen 
noncontributory pensions 
 
Note: Level of income loosely refers to the classification used by the World Bank, with low income referring to International 
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